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In tl1e Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
LONE STAR URANIUM & DRILLING 
COMPANY, a covporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LELAND J. DAVIS, and BARBARA 
N. DAVIS, hls wife, RAY DAVIS and 
MARY G. DAVIS, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CIVIL 
NO. 8986 
Defendants agree with plaintiff's opening statement 
setting forth how this action was brought before the Court. 
However, all of the faotJs in thBir proper sequence were nort 
staJted. Defendants state the facts as follows: 
On November 5, 1964, plaintiff and defendants entered 
into the particulaT option Hgreement and contract to pur-
chase wh~ch is set fiorth in appellant's brief and which is 
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made an exhibit to the action. Pursuant thereto the de-
fendants filed an action agalnst James Mallory and Wesley 
Edwards and as a result of the action, in January, 1955, 
ousted Mallory and Edwards from possession and since that 
date defendants have been in the actual possession of the 
property (Tr. 23, 24 Davis). Since J·anuary of 1955 the 
defendants have been ready, willing and able to convey 
the property to the plaintiff free and clear of the claim of 
Mallory and Edwards (Tr. 25 Davis) (Tr. 43 Bentley), 
however the plaintiff failed to and refused to tender per-
formance on its part. The plaintiff at all times stated that 
it was ready to perform and that it intended to perform, 
but that no tender of performance was ever made on its 
behalf {Tr. 33 Davis) (Tr. 44 Bentley). Plaintiff notified 
defendants on several occasions, including occasions after 
the expiration of the six-month period, that said plaintiff 
intended to complete the purchase when the outstanding 
judgment was paid (Tr. 29 Davis - Ex. 7), however, no ten-
der of performance was ever forthcoming. The deeds were 
placed in the bank (Tr. 44 Bentley), abstracts were pre-
pared (Tr. 32 Bentley), and delivered to plaintiffs attor-
neys, Rod Dixon and Wilcox, (Tr. 49 Bentley) (Tr. 51 
Metos, L. 21-22) and defendants were ready, willing and 
able to perform the contract of sale and purchase. On Au-
gust 17, 1955, the plaintiff demanded from the defendants 
the $2,500.00 previously paid to the defendants by the plain-
tiff still without ever having tendered performance on its 
part. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE 
ON THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN FAILING TO GRANT THJE !DgFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS F AlLURE TO 
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED ITS OPTION TO 
CONTINUE THE CONTRACT IN EFFECT FOR AN 
ADDITIONAL YEAR. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT IS SUPPORTED BY TIIE UNDIS-
PUTED EVTDENCE. 
POINT 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO THE CROSS-PLAINTIFFS FOR SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT BASED 
ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
POINT 5 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO 
AWARD DAMAGES TO THE CROSS-PLAINTIFFS CON-
TRARY TO THE UNDIS:flUTED EVIDENCE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN· FAILING TO RULE 
ON THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN FAILING TO GRANT THlE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
Plaintiff, to prove its prima facie case, merely sub-
mitted into evidence Exmbit 1 and E~bit 2. E~bit 2 
is a ropy of the option agreement and contrnct 1D purchase. 
Exh:irnt 1 is a ·certified oopy of a Decree and an Amended 
Decree in the matter o!f Leland Davis versus James ffi Mal-
lory and Wesley Edwards filed in the District Court o!f San 
Juan County, State of Utah. By the introduction of plain-
tiff's Emi:bit 2 and by the provisions thereof, it will be 
noted that the said option agreement and contract to pur-
chase provides "or at the option of the buyer, the time with-
in which the sellers shall have to retake possession of the 
property from the above named lessees, Mallory and Ed-
wards, and finally and absolutely tenninate said lease, may 
be exiended for an additional period of time not to exceed 
one (1) year from dalte of this agreement.'' Plalintiff put 
on no evidence that it did not exercise the option and extend 
the agreement for a period of one year. 
Plaintiff, by its Exhibit 1, ·merely put on evidence to 
the effect that an encumbrance existed against the prop-
erty. Plainti·f.f further failed to put on any evidence that 
plaintiff had tendered performance to the defendants. 
The law is clear that prior to bringing an action for 
breach of contract the vendee need offer to perform. 
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Spellman-How To Prove A Prima Facie Case-3rd 
Edition Page 473, 476, 569, 570. 
The rule is stated in 1 Am. Jur. at Page 427 as follows: 
"Thus performance, or offer to perform, is gener-
ally a necessary ·condition precedent to the bringing of 
an action on a contract." 
And at 1 Am. Jur. 454 it is further stated: 
"There must be eirther a performance or a waiver 
of all conditions precedent before the cause of action 
can arise upon a conditional contract." 
An annotation at 40 ALR 693 entitled: 
"Payment or tender of unpaid purchase money 
as condition precedent to the right of a purchaser of 
land to rescind on ·the ground of defects in or want of 
title." 
The rule is stated as follows, Page 693: 
"The general rule 1s that in the case of a contract 
containing concurrent conditions or mutual and de-
pendent covenants, either an offer of performance or 
of readiness to perform by one party must be shown 
before he can charge the other with a breach, and 
without a breach there can be no ground for rescission. 
Boyd v. McCulloug1h (1890) 137 Pa. 7, 20 Atl. 630." 
The note further states, Page 693: 
"Where the time of perfiormance passes without 
anything being done, the time for performance becomes 
indefinite, burt the obligations of the parties are never-
theless mutua land concurrent. Boyd v. McCullough 
(Pa.) supra. See also Poheim v. Me~ers (1908) 9 Ca. 
kpp. 31, 98 Pac. 65, in which it is held that where the 
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vendee in. a contract in which time is of the essence 
is in default, he •cannot, without tendering the balance 
due, recover a payment theretofore made on the con-
tract, on the ground that the title of the vendor is de-
fective .. 
The decisions on the subject appear to warrant 
the following generalizations: Where the vendor has 
until the time for performance to obtain title to the 
property which he has contracted to convey, or to rem-
edy defeots in 'SUOh title, the purchaser cannot, prior 
to the time of performance daim the right to rescind 
because of such defects, and so must make a tender 
in order to put the vendor in default. Papesh v. Wag-
nan (1916) 29 Idaho, 93, 157 Pac. 775; Laub v. De 
Vault (1908) 139 Ill . .App. 398; Claude v. Richardson 
(1905) 127 Iowa, 623, 103 N. W. 991. Greenby v. Chee-
vers (1812) 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 126; PioneeT Gold Min. 
Co. v. Price (1915) 189 Mo. App. 30, 176 S. W. 474; 
GoJdman v. Willis (1901) 64 App. Div. 508, 72 N. Y. 
~upp. 292; Ward v. James (1917) 84 Or. 375, 164 Pac. 
370, 372. 
Where no time is f.ixed for completion of the trans-
fer, there being merely an understanding that it is to 
take place within a few days of the signing of the 
ooo.tract, the purchaser must tender the balance of 
the purchase price in order to put the vendor in de-
fault. Goldman v. Willis (1901) 64 .App. Div. 508, 72 
N. Y. Supp. 292. 
Where under the terms of the contract the obli-
gatioo to pay precedes or accompanies the obligation 
to make title, the purchaser must, in order to put the 
seller in default, pay or offer to pay the purehase 
money; and hence cannot rescind on the ground of a 
defect in the title without tendering performance on 
his part. Dennis v. Strassburger (1891) 89 Cal. 583, 
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26 Pac. 1070; Leach v. Rowley (1903) 138 Cal. 709, 
. 72 Pac. 403; Eames v. Germania. Turn Verrein (1881) 
8 TIL Alpp. 663; Qaude v. R1dhardson (1905) 127 Iowa, 
623, 103 N. W. 991; Hartley v. James (1872) 50 N. Y. 
38." 
Concerning an encumbrance to pay money, the note 
states, Page 701: 
"Inabhlity of the vendor to perform is not estab-
lished by proO!f of the existence of encumbrances prior 
to 1Jhe time fOT performance, since the vendor is not 
bound to perfect his title until that tilne. Laub v. De 
Fault (1908) 138 Ill. App. 398; Greenby v. Cheevers 
(1812) 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 12,6; Papesh v. Wagnon (1916) 
29 Idaho, 93, 157 Pac. 775. 
Although the decisions are not entirely harmoni-
oos, the weight of authority is that the purchaser does 
not establish the vendor's inability to make title by 
proving the existence of an enoumbranee on the date 
fixed for perlormance. Pate v. McConnel (1894) 106 
Ala. 449, 18 So. 98; Griesemer v. Hammond (1912) 18 
Cal. App. 535, 123 Pac. 818; Claude v. Richardson 
(1905) 127 Iowa, 623, 103 N. W. 991; Pioneer Gold 
Min. Co. v. Brice (1915) 189 Mo. App. 30, 176 S. W. 
474; Campbell v. Prague (1896) 6 App. Div. 554, 39 
N. Y. Supp. 558; Whitney v. Crouch (1918) 105 Misc. 
268, 172 N.Y. Supp. 729; Ziehen v. Smith (1896) 148 
N. Y. 558, 24 N. E. 1080; Woodman v. Blue Grass Land 
Oo. (1905) 125 Wis. 489, 103 N. W. 236, 104 N. W. 
920. But see as apparently contra, Blunt v. Kelly 
(1920) 219 Ill. App. 327; Burk v. Schreiberr (1903) 183 
Mass. 35, 66 N. E. 411; Richards v. Jarvis (1925) - Ida-
ho, - , 238 Pac. 887. 
And this has been held even in a case in which 
the mortgage was not yet due and payable, on the 
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ground that it was posstble that the mortgagee would 
be willing to accept payment and release the lien be-
fore maturity of the obligation. Pioneer Gold Min. 
Co. v. Price (1915) 189 Mo. App. 30, 176 S. W. 474. 
But see contra, Seibel v. Purehase (1904) 134 Fed. 
484, where it is held incUmbent upon 1Jhe vendor to 
show that the mortgagee was ready to accept pay-
ment." 
The case of Gillmore v. Green (Wash.) 23~ Pac. 2d 
998, the Washington Court states at Page 1002: 
"The burden is upon the plaintiffs, vendee, to al-
lege and prove that the vendor cannot perfonn when 
the time for performance arises." 
"--the duty to pay -- and the duty of vendor to con-
vey are concurrent, dependent and mutual acts, and 
the vendee may not rescind the contract wifuout a ten-
der of the purchase price. 'We stated in Eberhart v. 
Lind, 176 Wash. 316, $19, 23 Pac. 2d 17, 18,' It is a 
well setJtled I"Ulle that a party in default cannot main-
tain an action of rescission without first tendering per-
formance or showing a willingness to perfonn or else 
clearly estaJblishing such facts as would excuse perform~ 
ance by him." 
The Court goes on to state that on a time contract 
neither party can put the other in default without a tender 
of performance. See Gledhill v. Malouf (Utah) 197 P. 725. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO 
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED ITS OPTION TO 
OONTINUE THE CONTRACT IN EFFEcr FOR AN 
ADDITIONAL YEAR. 
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The option agreement and contract to purchase does 
not state how the plaintiff will exercise its option to ex-
tend the agreement for an additional year. Thus it would 
appear that the option might be exercised in any one of a 
various nwnber of ways. The record is clear that after the 
5th day of May, 1955, the plaintiff indicated its intention 
to complete the contract. Exhibit 7 dated June 9, 1955_, 
(Tr. 29, L. 13 Davis) is a telegram from the President of 
the plaintiff company which states "We will close Brum-
ley Ridge deal when our attorneys advise us to do so. They 
say judgment still outstanding on Brumley Ridge." ~he 
deeds from defendants to plaintiff were placed in escrow 
on June 2, 1955, (Bentley Tr. 44, L. 4) and the plaintiff 
was so notified. Exhibit 7 was the answer to the letter of 
Mr. Benrtley advising the plaintiff that the deeds were in 
escrow. In addition, the plaintiff, through its president, 
Robert Y wber, verbally informed the attorney for the de-
fendants, on or a:boUlt April 17, 1955, that the defendants 
had a deal ~and that he COIUld not undersrtand why Davis 
was worried abourt irt. (Tr. 45, L. 6-15 - Bentley). Also, 
Mr. Tom Mertos, an officer of the plaintiff corporation and 
an attorney for the plaintiff corporation, in June or July 
of 1955, had a conversation wirtJh one of the defendants (Tr. 
51 L. 9-10 Metos) wherein Mr. Metos testified (Tr. 36 L. 1)-: 
"He asked - I asked - rather, I mentioned to him that the 
judgment against the claim that Mallory and Edwards had 
hadn't been verified and that due to that fact why we were 
not going through with the oontmct until it was later deared 
up; and we later changed our minds and demanded our 
money back." 
Thus it is clear from the uncontradi-cted testimony 
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that by the acts and statements and telegram of the plain-
tiff that iJt exercised its option to continue the conrtract for 
an additional year and, consequently, the defendants could 
not have been in de:fjault even under the pl,ainrtiff's theory. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSJ!ON OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT IS SUPPORTED BY THE UNDIS-
PUTED EVIDENCE. 
FT~om what has been previously stated under Points 
1 and 2 it is clear that the trial court's conclusion of law 
tlhSJt plaintiff has no cause m action against the defendants 
is supported borth by the evidence and i:Jhe law and that 
there is no evidence to the effect that the plaintiff should 
recover against the defendants. 
POINT 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO THE CROSS-PLAINTIFFS FOR SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT BASED 
ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
The uncontradicted evidence is to the erffeot that the 
defendams had good title to i:Jhe property and were ready 
to convey a good and sufficient title to i:Jhe plamtiff under 
the terms of the agreement. Since tlhere is no evidence 
to the ~contrary and since the agreement concerns real prop.. 
erty, the defendants are entitled, by law, to a decree of 
specifi.c perfom1ance against the plaintiff. 
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POINT 5 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO 
AWARD DAMAGES TO THE CROSS-PLAINTiffS CON-
TRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that the de-. 
fendants spent money in reliance upon the conrtraot and 
in reliance upon the assurance on the part of the plaintiff 
that the rplamtiff would perforn1. The ev1dence is clear 
that the defendanrts ex:pended .1Jhe sum of $11,364.75 in reo. 
Hance on ·the contract and in reliance upon the perform-
ance of ·the plaintiff (Tr. 31, 32 - Davis). The evidence is 
undisputed that defendants made the foregoing expendi-
tures in reliance upon the contract and bared on said evi-
dence ·the defendants are entitled to have judgment entered 
in the amount of said expenditures. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
ArtJtorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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